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106   APPALACHIA
Accidents
Analysis from the White Mountains of  
New Hampshire and occasionally elsewhere
I SPENT MUCH OF LAST WINTER’S CORE TUCKED INTO THE VALLEY THAT runs finally up against the headwall of the Cardigan–Firescrew upland in 
west–central New Hampshire. There, as was true a few miles to the north 
in the high White Mountains, the snow piled up. Even as occasional thaws 
melted back the depths, new snow kept arriving; the result was a thick and 
solid throwback snowpack that made an excellent base for wandering up and 
sliding down hills little and large.
One late-January day I strapped on snowshoes and bushwhacked oh-so-
slowly up a local ridge through 16 inches of new snow in the beech and 
hemlock groves. Moose had already browsed the buds of their favored 
hobblebush twigs and moved on to the birch and maples. Wild turkeys were 
roosting in the trees and scouring tree wells for seed; they were peeved when 
I flushed them, and they winged their heavy bodies up to new perches. Their 
preferred bird-foot travel was simply impossible. The presence of tree wells at 
all marked this as a different winter. Out West, these are wells to be wary of. 
Every year, a few skiers tumble into them, get mired there and don’t get out. 
In the East, we have spruce traps; tree wells here at their most lethal catch 
turkeys. Still, they speak of a different kind of winter. More than once, I heard 
winter 2018–2019 referred to as “old style.”
This opening series of skiing incidents clearly had their origins in new-
style practices. To consider them and the rescue efforts they spawned, we will 
first follow their skiers off-piste (off the regular ski run). 
Late Slide
On January 3, 2019, 20-year-old Demarco A. gathered his backcountry 
ski gear and set off at 10:30 A.M. up Carter–Moriah Trail from Gorham, 
New Hampshire. His goal was a nearly mile-long rock slide he’d spotted 
on the north side of Mount Moriah while trail running in the open season. 
That Demarco had been running near the top of the 4,000-footer says a lot 
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about his fitness and appetite for foot motion. As would be expected, he 
made good time on this 4.5-mile climb; that changed dramatically when he 
began his bushwhack down to the slide’s top. Uneven terrain, thick cover, and 
deep snow made the going very slow, and, in later recounting his ordeal to 
New Hampshire Fish and Game conservation officers, Demarco estimated 
that he didn’t reach the slide until nearly 4 P.M.
There, in the gathering dusk, he had a decision to make: Ski the slide, 
which drops about 1,300 vertical feet, and make his way out from its base, or 
retrace his steps and walk back down Carter–Moriah Trail. The ski descent of 
the slide won out. Before shoving off, Demarco called home, and, through 
a sketchy connection, relayed his decision and the fact that he was anxious 
about it. The connection then failed, although some further texts did get 
through, and they underlined Demarco’s uncertainty. Demarco’s call and 
texts set off a search that would run parallel to his efforts to work his way 
home that night.
Demarco’s mother, Brandy, then called his father, Rodney, to say that she 
was worried about their son, and Rodney called Gorham police to report that 
Demarco might be lost or in trouble on Mount Moriah. Gorham police then 
alerted NHFG, and CO Matthew Holmes got in touch with Rodney. Mean-
while, Demarco had skied to the bottom of the slide, shifted from skiing to 
walking, and begun to hike north along the Pea Brook drainage.
While conferring with CO Holmes, Rodney said he would gear up and 
climb the Carter–Moriah Trail in search of his son, preferring this family-
rescue plan to asking NHFG to search. CO Holmes agreed to this, and, 
as backup, he alerted two other COs and checked in with Lt. Mark Ober. 
Rodney promised he would stay in touch with Holmes. While this planning 
took place, Demarco’s younger brother Eli set off up the trail, reaching the 
summit of Mount Surprise (roughly the halfway point) before turning back 
without making contact with his brother.
Rodney climbed into the night with a full pack, and, as he rose, he 
stopped periodically to call out to Demarco. (Demarco later said he heard 
some of those calls but couldn’t locate their source.) Rodney also stayed in 
touch with Holmes via phone, and, as Rodney reached the summit area 
of Mount Moriah, he reported no contact with his son. But a little before 
10 P.M., Rodney found his son’s tracks and began to follow them. He alerted 
Holmes to this, and they agreed that Rodney would stay on the track toward 
town. Demarco, meanwhile, had climbed out of the Pea Brook drainage and, 
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from the ridge, sighted the lights of Gorham; he took aim toward them. This 
led him to a complex of logging roads with which he was familiar, and the 
roads led him to Route 2. He followed Route 2 into Gorham and reached 
home at around 10:30 P.M.
Holmes got a call about Demarco’s return, called Rodney to confirm that 
he knew, and then drove to the house and interviewed Demarco. Near the 
interview’s end, Rodney arrived back at the house. Holmes and COs Jim Cyrs 
and Eric Fluette then cleared the call from the record and went home; it was 
well after midnight.
Comment: Every backcountry adventurer has a similar tale to tell from 
his or her early years. Part of the pleasure of being fit and having a body that 
responds nicely to demand lies in spontaneity: Oh, look! I think I’ll go there. 
Most of these tales go untold, except at the dinner table or over a beer at a bar.
Phones, however, have changed some of that dynamic. Had Demarco not 
called from atop the slide, it’s likely that his family would have waited into 
the night—anxiously—as we all tend to when someone is late. But one call 
led to the next, and then to the next. Calling is now so routine, a sort of up-
to-the-minute reporting, that we rarely think of how our call may land. It also 
allows the caller a chance to voice anxiety, which is often a way of controlling 
said nerves. Once, for example, I’ve voiced concern over something I’m about 
to attempt, I’ve also envisioned doing it; that often calms me.
But the charge of anxiety can then land on the other end of the line. 
Consider Demarco’s mother: There’s her son, at the head of a wilderness, 
rock slide slope with dusk coming on. She knows he’s fit and capable, but 
what if—and the possibilities multiply, fueled by his voiced anxiety. Demarco 
hangs up, looks downslope, and skis its nearly mile length and 1,300-foot 
drop, reaches the bottom, shifts to foot travel, and begins to walk out. Perhaps 
his mother imagines that scenario, but tens of others crowd it out, and they 
are chock-full of trouble. I need to do something, she thinks, and she calls 
Demarco’s father. Each call leads to another.
Parallel stories set up through the evening hours: Demarco works his way 
north, toward Gorham and home. He has a light, he’s fit, he’s fine. But his 
family doesn’t know that and sets out to do the work of finding him; they go 
south. NHFG’s CO Holmes stays in touch, but he keeps his forces in reserve 
and lets the family work out this search. Were report of trouble to arrive, he 
has two COs ready to go, and he could summon more help, but he waits. 
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I like Holmes’s decision and I like the family’s work at self-sufficiency. 
It presents a rescue ideal of going out to get your own that plays forward in 
various iterations throughout the search and rescue community.
Before we leave this incident, a few thoughts about Demarco’s decisions. 
A few are clear don’ts: 10:30 A.M. is too late to begin in January; going solo to 
an unskied, off-trail slide seems a risk-too-far. What’s the skiing going to be 
like? What’s the line of descent, left side or right? What’s over the next hump? 
Too many questions. Your question: So, if he’s anxious at the slide’s top, why 
did he ski it?
I’m guessing that time and terrain made Demarco’s decision for him. 
In the waning light, retracing his difficult way back up to the summit of 
Moriah and the trail must have been unappealing. The climb would have 
been around 700 vertical feet, and it would have taken Demarco through the 
thick, subalpine scrub that so many of us have rued tangling with. A long, 
dark slog, followed by an unexciting 4.5-mile walk out. The ski-descent, on 
the other hand, looked open, and, though he’d never been there, Demarco 
would have known that at roughly 2,000 feet the woods would be much taller 
and more open; walking down there would be easier. And downhill. And so, 
it was a go. 
It’s likely that, once down in the Pea Brook valley, Demarco didn’t have 
cell reception, but after he climbed the ridge and sighted Gorham’s lights, he 
probably did. A phone call then would have shortened the night’s anxiety. 
Even as CO Holmes and his support officers assumed a waiting stance, they 
were still out beyond midnight resolving the call.
A Call from the Throat
A midday call on February 24 set in motion the rescue of an injured skier on 
Mount Lincoln in New Hampshire’s Franconia Notch. Kellen B. had placed 
the call on behalf of his friend Patrick L., age 27. That morning the two 
friends had set out up Old Bridle Path, then dropped from it into the Walker 
Brook drainage. From there, they climbed up the brook valley and onto a 
slide that falls from the west flank of Mount Lincoln. Their intent was to get 
well up the slide and then ski down it.
The slide, often called Lincoln’s Throat, has become popular with 
backcountry skiers and climbers, and, as its reputation has grown, Lincoln’s 
Throat has begun to appear in accident reports. Clearly seen from the 
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ridge that carries Old Bridle Path, the slide is a lure to those who seek less-
tracked terrain.
NHFG Lt. Jim Kneeland spent some time establishing a connection 
with the pair, but once he’d done so around 1:20 P.M. and heard their report, 
Kneeland summoned two COs and volunteers from Pemigewasset Valley 
Search and Rescue Team; PVSART’s president, Alan Clark, had heard the 
initial call, and he had a team of rescuers and a SKED (a rescue litter that 
flexes and so snakes more easily through hard terrain) ready to go.
Kneeland also had advised Kellen and Patrick to try to descend slowly 
from the site of their initial call at 3,800 feet, where they were sheltering but 
also growing cold and wet. The weather reported at the Mount Washington 
Observatory that day featured 4.4 inches of snow with a water content of 
0.8 inches, in other words heavy, wet snow of the sort that soaks through 
fabric and promotes hypothermia. The pair said they would work to get lower.
At 2:40 P.M. the first rescuers set out. By 4:20 P.M. initial rescuers had 
reached Patrick and Kellen about a tenth of a mile above the point where the 
south fork of Walker Brook diverges from the main stem. That meeting place 
points to the pair’s success in moving from 3,800 feet and an exposed wait to 
the deeper valley and its protection, a section of self-rescue estimated at nearly 
a mile. Kneeland’s report notes, “They splinted his leg to ski poles and then 
strapped a ski to the leg so that Patrick could slide down on his butt.” Such an 
effort also shortened markedly the work of NHFG’s and PVSART’s rescuers, 
and they all emerged from the woods at 5:45 P.M.
Comment: Backcountry skiing—like its relations, climbing and 
bushwhacking—carries the added risk of isolation. Far fewer people are likely 
to be in Lincoln’s Throat than in Tuckerman Ravine or along the Falling 
Waters Trail loop, and so such adventure asks for added self-sufficiency. Even 
as Patrick’s injury impelled them to call for help, this pair of skiers also showed 
resilience after Kneeland’s encouragement to try to get lower as they waited. 
By the time rescuers arrived, Kellen and Patrick had reduced substantially the 
distance rescue would require. Such a joint effort by the rescued and rescuers 
seems simply right.
Cataract Trouble
April 11 featured blue sky, moderate temperatures, light winds, and snow-
chocked slopes on the east side of Mount Washington. It was, in short, the 
sort of Thursday on which a skier might look up and say, “Oh, to be free to 
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go today.” Nicholas B., age 32, was able to conjure that freedom, even as he 
could not find a companion to share it with, and he climbed up for a day of 
earned turns, arriving late morning in the scallop-shaped open terrain above 
Raymond Cataract. As this report’s source, the Mount Washington Avalanche 
Center, notes, Raymond Cataract is “an ephemeral, but recently popular ski 
descent only possible during winters with a deep snowpack.” Deep-snow 2019 
offered just such a snowpack.
As Nicholas dropped in toward the cataract, a pair of hikers on Lion 
Head saw him and remarked on his solid, skillful turns; two skiers ascending 
Tuckerman Ravine Trail also saw a solo skier above before they returned to 
their uphill labors. Soon after these sightings, Nicholas skied over a convex 
bulge and triggered an avalanche. That avalanche, relatively modest at its 
crown (average depth, about 14 inches; width, 130 feet) carried him into a 
terrain trap where the narrowing drainage walls concentrated the snow, which 
buried him.
The Mount Washington Observatory webcam on Wildcat Mountain 
points toward these open eastern slopes, and it showed the avalanche falling 
between noon and 12:05 P.M.. At around 1:30 P.M. U.S. Forest Service snow 
ranger Frank Carus stopped to talk with a friend on Tuckerman Ravine Trail 
about a new avalanche crown the friend had seen. Given an avalanche forecast 
for possible human-triggered slides that day, Carus thought it prudent to 
check on this new avalanche. He gathered his gear and binoculars and climbed 
to a spot where he could scan the slide; that scan revealed a faint, single-skier 
track in the snow above the new crown. It was now 1:53 P.M. Carus had a 
potential emergency on his hands.
Carus called on nearby snow rangers Helon Hoffer and Jeff Fongemie, and 
the Appalachian Mountain Club’s Hermit Lake caretaker, Sarah Goodnow, to 
mobilize. Then, at 2:05 P.M., Carus skinned up the Lion Head Winter Route 
and broke off into the woods, aiming to intersect with the avalanche debris he 
imagined in the gully above. At 2:10 P.M. Carus reached the foot of the debris; 
no tracks led away from it. 
Realizing someone could be buried in the debris and that he could not 
see the place where the avalanche had begun, Carus had a decision to make: 
wait for reinforcements or start searching now. The risk of immediately 
beginning lay in not knowing if more sliding snow might arrive from above 
and having no one to dig him out if it did. But significant time had passed 
already, and Carus decided to begin searching. He switched his avalanche 
beacon to receive and got a signal 80 feet away. The signal both simplified and 
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complicated the situation. Yes, someone was buried nearby and that needed 
immediate response. But the presence of the turned-on beacon made Carus 
wonder if Nicholas had been skiing with someone else, and so Carus worried 
another skier could be buried nearby. 
Carus began probing, and he struck a soft resilience 47 inches down. He 
stepped a few feet downhill and began to dig. He first heard moaning from 
beneath the snow, kept digging, and reached a hand, then a helmet. Carus 
cleared snow from around Nicholas’s face, tried to reassure the skier that help 
was here, and sought to learn if anyone else had been with Nicholas. Only 
eight minutes had passed since Carus’s arrival.
Hoffer, acting as incident commander, made calls asking for advanced life 
support. At 2:30 P.M. a Life Flight helicopter left Lewiston, Maine, aiming 
for AMC’s Pinkham Notch Visitor Center. Fongemie and Goodnow reached 
the site, bringing with them two volunteers they’d met on the way. Another 
beacon check reassured them that no other skier lay buried nearby. Nicholas 
had been buried in a seated, upright posture, with his feet at a depth of about 
six feet. The rescuers kept digging, slow work in the dense snow and ice, and 
as they uncovered Nicholas, he tried to stand and flailed his arms.
Nicholas tried to stand once again and then collapsed. The snow rang-
ers noted shallow, erratic breathing, and as they checked, could not find a 
pulse. They began CPR at 2:34 P.M. Soon, Goodnow and the two volunteers 
returned from the Lion Head rescue cache with a litter, and the five rescuers 
strapped Nicholas into the litter and began a descent of the drainage, all the 
while continuing CPR. Once they had pulled the litter up from the stream-
bed and into the forest, Fongemie rode in the litter and continued CPR. 
At the intersection with the trail, a snowcat met them for the 2-mile ride to 
Pinkham; they continued CPR throughout that ride. The cat arrived in the 
Pinkham parking lot at 3:30 P.M., where they were met by the Life Flight 
crew and a Gorham EMS ambulance crew. Sadly, the advanced life support 
applied to Nicholas could not revive him, and he was declared dead at 4 P.M.
Comment: I begin with the summary from the Mount Washington Ava-
lanche Center’s report:
Anyone with a bit of avalanche education may question the terrain 
selection that Nicholas made that day, but many more would admit to 
making similar choices in similar conditions. The fateful mistakes that 
Nicholas made were skiing alone and skiing above a terrain trap that 
carried significant consequence. The slope which released contained 
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a slab just barely large enough to bury a person; add a funnel and a 
narrow streambed to this and the avalanche debris became more than 
enough to bury Nicholas. Though surviving an avalanche on that day 
above that terrain trap is far from certain, having a partner skilled in 
companion rescue may have saved Nicholas in this case, assuming 
effective companion rescue occurred immediately after the avalanche. 
One other notable factor in this accident was the fact that at least three 
parties observed and later reported seeing what appeared to be a fresh 
crown line in Raymond Cataract. No one made the 5–10 minute diver-
sion to look for clues or do a beacon search of the debris where a ski 
and pole were on the surface 75 feet uphill of the burial site.
    As backcountry skiing, and more specifically steep skiing in ava-
lanche terrain, continues to grow in popularity, we at MWAC continue 
to hope that people will get educated by taking avalanche courses as 
well as bring a partner and the appropriate skills and equipment into 
the terrain. For many of us, Nicholas’s death gives us an opportunity to 
reflect on our own risky behaviors. Nicholas, like many of us in the ski 
community, loved to ski and had taken many of the steps necessary to 
stay safe while doing it. He had avalanche education under his belt, he 
carried a ski repair kit, extra layers, plenty of water, and a first-aid and 
survival kit. He was wearing a beacon and carrying a probe and shovel. 
Unfortunately, no one was watching from a safe location while he skied 
the slope, ready to rescue him before time ran out.
The MWAC forecast for the day pointed to “moderate” risk. That risk grew 
from an icy surface and 3 inches of recent new snow that had been shaped 
into windslabs by a northwest wind. Avalanches were “possible,” especially 
when given a human trigger. As the snow rangers point out in their analysis of 
this incident, “A Moderate avalanche danger rating is frequently considered 
manageable by educated backcountry skiers. . . . Due to these windslabs in 
our terrain, skiing a steep slope on a windslab is the norm all winter.”
Imagine yourself at the various decision points that drive this sad story 
forward. You are an advanced skier with Nicholas’s training; it is a deep 
winter, providing expansive access; your usual companions can’t join you; the 
day is achingly blue. What do you do?
I’ve often touted the MWAC’s snow forecasting and analyses of incidents. 
For decades, if you would know snow, their snow rangers have been the 
people to see and listen to. Recently, MWAC’s outreach has expanded in 
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two particularly significant ways. First, instead of confining its forecasts to 
the east-facing ravines, MWAC now applies its forecasts to the whole range 
around Mount Washington. In doing so, MWAC emphasizes that avalanches 
are not confined to Tuckerman and Huntington Ravines; nor is the Gulf of 
Slides the only other place where snow slides. Most mountain people know 
this, but explicit inclusion broadens that awareness. Second, MWAC has also 
increased the frequency and detail of incident reporting and analysis. My 
summary is drawn largely from their reportage, and it is essential reading for 
those of us who would know the ways in which trouble happens and may be 
avoided in the White Mountains.
At the same time I’m writing this, I’m reading Being Mortal: Medicine 
and What Matters in the End (Picador, 2015), Atul Gawande’s work about 
viewing and treating aging and mortality. This passage on page 140 considers 
autonomy and freedom:
USFS snow rangers Frank Carus and Jeff Fongemie investigate the crown of the 
avalanche that killed an experienced skier in April 2019 on the east side of  
Mount Washington. MOUNT WASHINGTON AVALANCHE CENTER 
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The late, great philosopher Ronald Dworkin recognized that there is a 
second, more compelling sense of autonomy. Whatever the limits and 
travails we face, we want to retain the autonomy—the freedom—to be 
the authors of our lives. This is the very marrow of being human. As 
Dworkin wrote in his remarkable 1986 essay on the subject: “The value 
of autonomy . . . lies in the scheme of responsibility it creates: Autonomy 
makes each of us responsible for shaping his own life according to some 
coherent and distinctive sense of character, conviction, and interest. It 
allows each of us to lead our own lives rather than be led along them, so 
that each of us can be, to the extent such a scheme of rights can make 
this possible, what he has made himself.”
 
I see Nicholas, a skilled backcountry skier, dropping into the scallop-shaped 
slope of Raymond Cataract. Here he is on a best April day in an old-style, 
deep-snow winter. As noted by hikers atop Lion Head, his turns are strong, 
fluid. He will ski this line; he will leave his script of a track. Then, he skis over 
the bulge on a 39-degree slope, and the firm snow dissolves into motion; the 
world slides away, taking him with it. I never knew Nicholas, but I am sorry 
he is gone, even as I remain glad that he chose and wrote his line. 
On Ice
On March 13, 2019, NHFG COs and an Androscoggin Valley Search and 
Rescue volunteer responded to a 6:15 P.M. call about a skier stranded in Burt 
Ravine on Mount Washington’s west side. The caller, a friend of Sean B., age 
20, said that Sean had become stuck when he’d skied down into icy conditions 
in the ravine. Sean could not go up or down for fear of falling.
Rescuers used a snowmobile to ascend the Cog Railway to Jacob’s Ladder 
and then hiked to the edge of the ravine. Once there, a rescuer was able to 
descend to the stranded skier, secure him with a harness and rope, and then 
guide him up out of the ravine. That extrication was complete by 10:20 P.M., 
and rescuers and skiers reached the mountain’s base at 11 P.M.
Comment: NHFG’s official report is not yet available because this rescue 
is involved in ongoing litigation, but even the incident’s bare bones reported 
in public media raise eyebrows. Sean was reported to have no equipment with 
which he might have self-rescued.
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Stilled, Waiting, Wondering
On December 14, 2018, NHFG Lt. Jim Kneeland was at the agency’s dispatch 
office when a series of phone calls came in about a Facebook post. The post 
from Robert C., age 25, read as follows: “Send help, stuck by a cairn on old 
bridle in alpine between hut and Lafayette summit. Wind took map and 
compass in white out conditions.” Robert had also sent a text to 911 asking 
for help; Kneeland tried calling back but got only voice mail. His text did 
get through, however, and Robert confirmed that he needed help. The time, 
unusual for a rescue call, was 10 A.M.
Kneeland called COs Glen Lucas and Kevin Bronson, and they set off 
up Old Bridle Path at 12:20 P.M. Kneeland also summoned a backup team 
of two more COs in case Robert proved hard to find. Later, Robert got a 
brief call through to 911, and that provided COs with his coordinates, which 
placed him just below the summit of Lafayette; the two COs reached him at 
4:35 P.M. At 7 P.M. Robert and his rescuers reached the trailhead.
This straightforward rescue recommends itself for a revealing exchange of 
texts between Kneeland and Robert. Kneeland is identified by the initials JK, 
Robert by the initials RC. The exchange begins at 10:12 A.M., and, at outset, it 
is informational and tone-neutral: 
JK: “Rob. Fish and game here. Do you need help”
RC: “Yes Old bridle path between hut and lafayette At cairn can’t find 
next one low visibility tried and failed repeatedly”
JK: “Ok we will be coming but it will take a while to get to you. Keep  
me posted”
The next exchange reported at 12:12 P.M. showed a shift in tone:
RC: “I think I’m just miserable not hypothermic. Snow got in through 
everything is wet. I’m scared.”
JK: “Ok, Help is on the way.”
RC: “Eta? Verge of falling asleep.”
JK: “At least two hours. Is the wind getting worse”
RC: “It’s been consistent.”
JK: “Ok. How many cairns below the summit do you estimate you are”
RC: “Unknown. When I tried to find my way I went down and I went 
that far away from shrubs that seemed to be just above a cliff. I feel like 
I need to move”
JK: “If you move to get warm just don’t get too far from cairn. Do  
you have any way to give me a coordinate of your location. How you 
doing Rob”
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RC: “U reception bad. It hurt but now it’s numb”
JK: “Iphone?”
RC: “I’m sleepy”
JK: “Move around a bit to get warm. Looks like the clouds are lifting 
some. Visibility any better?”
RC: “No”
JK: “Ok”
The next series of texts in midafternoon points to how waiting stretches 
out and gives way to raw fear.
RC: “Are they coming I’ll die overnight.”
JK: “They are coming. Just at hut. Coming your way. Have you tried 
calling 911 so I can get a coordinate of your location. I know you texted 
them but I can’t get a coordinate from a text. Got a coordinate before 
the call dropped. I’m plotting you now.”
RC: “Eta?”
JK: “They are about half mile away. Slow going.”
JK: “About a quarter mile away.”
RC: “Im scared”
JK: “They are one tenth away. Hang in there”
Comment: For context, let’s look briefly at Robert’s plan and the weather 
that trapped him. He set out at 2 A.M. with an eye toward climbing Lafayette 
and, if weather permitted, making his way along the Falling Waters loop. At 
7 A.M. he reported seeing bad weather on the way, and he turned back to 
retreat from Lafayette down Greenleaf Trail. But the weather then stalled 
him, and he spent the hours before his 10 A.M. request for rescue trying to 
find his way. 
The Mountain Washington Observatory reported an average temperature 
of 21 degrees Fahrenheit (11 above normal), with 1.3 inches of new snow and 
winds from the west averaging 43 MPH. Not weather to warm the soul but 
pretty routine for mid-December up high. Still, as Robert’s dilemma makes 
clear, even minor storminess can stall an inexperienced winter hiker, especially 
above treeline, where finding the trail corridor asks for vision. Robert was 
carrying a map and compass that could have helped replace his weather-
compromised vision, but when he took them out, the wind grabbed their 
plastic bag and blew it away. Retrieving (and keeping) items from a pack in 
even moderate wind takes practice.
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The text messages show the raw feelings of a trapped hiker, and they 
highlight the now-inbred expectation of speed brought by high-tech compared 
with the step-by-step plod of a rescue in difficult conditions. Fear finds its way 
into the empty space between the call for help and rescuers’ arrival. Add in 
the accelerated wind and whipping snow, both of which threaten and isolate. 
Everything seems fast except the creep of rescue and the seep of cold. The 
texts, in their clipped form, capture this, much in the way that well-wrought 
thought bubbles define cartoon characters. When you are stilled and must 
wait, the little theater of imagination begins to play disaster clips.
Weathered
Sometimes going a short distance can take a long time. That was true 
for Joshua K., age 36, who summoned rescue on Basin Cascades Trail, in 
Franconia Notch, on December 21, 2018. At 4 P.M., NHFG received a call 
from Joshua’s fiancée, who said Joshua had called her to say he was marooned 
on the south side of Basin Cascade Trail because he could not cross Cascade 
Brook. Its waters were raging with recent rain and snowmelt, and Joshua was 
wet and cold and a half-mile short of his car in the Basin parking lot. He said 
he needed rescue.
NHFG’s Lt. Mark Ober took charge of the incident, summoning two 
COs and asking AMC to make the Lonesome Lake Hut caretaker avail-
able for searching; Ober then drove to the Basin parking area, arriving at 
5:50 P.M. The temperature was in the 40s, with intermittent heavy rain. COs 
Matt Holmes and Jim Cyrs arrived ten minutes later, and, by then, Ober also 
had Joshua’s coordinates from a 911 call. Joshua was indeed about a half-mile 
up Basin Cascades Trail. Holmes and Cyrs headed up, and by 6:50 P.M. they 
were on the north side of the brook across from Joshua; they made eye con-
tact but could not hear each other over the roar of the river. Nor could the 
COs find any crossing that looked remotely safe, and so they called Ober to 
suggest that he call in specialists. Ober’s next calls went to Mountain Rescue 
Service and White Mountain Swiftwater Rescue Team.
By 10 P.M., five rescuers from MRS and six from WMSRT were at the 
parking lot, and they climbed quickly into the night. For nearly an hour, 
from 10:40 to 11:30 P.M., the rescuers searched for a place to attempt a crossing 
of the brook. Two WMSRT rescuers were able to cross successfully in their 
kayaks, carrying with them a rope they then used to set a highline traverse 
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above the water. By 12:30 A.M. rescuers from WMSRT and MRS had Joshua 
in a safety harness, and a little before 1 A.M., he and they were across the river. 
The group then hiked down to the parking area, where Ober interviewed 
Joshua and learned the fullness of his two-day story on Kinsman Pond and 
Cascade Brook Trails. By 2:15 A.M. rescuers had packed their gear, and every-
one had cleared the parking area.
When he began his hike around noon on the 20th, Joshua aimed for 
Kinsman Pond Shelter, and he carried with him a full complement of 
overnight gear, but he did not have rain gear. The other missing item in 
Joshua’s plan was a current, local weather forecast. The one he had from his 
home in southern New Hampshire called for showers moving in, and he later 
told Ober that he assumed southern rain would mean mountain snow.
On the night of the 20th, Joshua pulled up a half-mile short of Kinsman 
Pond Shelter and set up his tent for the night. Rain moved in overnight, and 
when he broke camp on the 21st, Joshua and his gear, including his sleeping 
bag, were wet; he then decided to abandon his plan to climb the Kinsmans 
and return to his car at the Basin. He made good progress until he reached the 
first crossing of Cascade Brook. There he found the brook more than living 
up to its name, and he thought trying to cross was unwise. Instead, he set out 
to bushwhack down the south side of the brook until he reached the final 
crossing. There, he hoped he’d find a way across.
The bushwhack was arduous, with heavy rain and sodden snow slowing 
him. By Joshua’s estimate, it took him several hours to cover three-quarters 
of a mile, and during that wallow, he lost both snowshoes when he sank into 
the snow and the shoes got stuck there. When he reached the final brook 
crossing around 3:30 P.M., he could see no way across; at that point he called 
his fiancée and asked her to summon rescue.
Comment: As Lt. Ober pointed out in his incident report, the weather 
bears careful attention here. When Joshua set out on the 20th, he had a 
general forecast for 100 miles south of where he wanted to climb, and the day 
must have been encouraging. The Mount Washington Observatory recorded 
an average temperature of 30, light winds, and sunshine 92 percent of the 
time on the 20th. Its report for the 21st shows how variable our mountain 
weather can be: average temperature, 38; rainfall, 1.98 inches; average wind 
speed, 59. The observatory also reported a snowpack of 16 inches on the 20th 
had dwindled to 9 inches on the 21st, and only 2 inches on the 22nd. That 
adds up to a lot of water seeking equilibrium.
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That Joshua failed to anticipate the coming waters set trouble in motion; 
that he could not keep himself dry in those waters shifted the incident from 
one of discomfort to possible emergency. Joshua said he called for help because 
he was afraid his feet would be too cold to continue on the 22nd. Also, it’s 
clear his bushwhack had been very difficult, and he was now without snow-
shoes. All of that added up to calling rather than persisting in a bushwhack 
that stayed south of Cascade Brook. It’s good Joshua did not try to force a 
river crossing, but it’s also clear he was in weather and terrain that exceeded 
his capabilities by a good measure.
Slick Surface
Here briefly, although the incident took 24 hours to resolve, is a story about 
winter footwear. Early on December 8, 2018, Randy W., age 40, set out up 
Nineteen-Mile Brook Trail. He hiked from there to Carter Dome Trail and 
then on to South Carter before reversing direction and hiking back along the 
range to Carter Notch Hut. As he neared the hut on the way back, Randy 
was descending a steep stretch of hardpack snow when he slipped. His left 
snowshoe got hung up at an awkward angle, and he felt a sharp pain in his 
ankle. Randy righted himself (although he couldn’t put weight on his ankle) 
and was butt-sliding down when a passerby arrived; that hiker went to the 
hut for help. Soon, AMC’s caretaker and five volunteers arrived, and they 
helped Randy cover the roughly quarter-mile to the hut. There, the caretaker 
splinted Randy’s ankle and called in the incident. AMC’s huts director, James 
Wrigley, then called NHFG, and they began to plan for a rescue in the 
morning if, as seemed likely, Randy was unable to walk out.
Randy found no improvement in his ankle the next morning, only 
ongoing pain and immobility, and NHFG organized a skid and carryout. 
Fifteen rescuers arrived at the trailhead—eight volunteers and seven NHFG 
COs—and set out. At the hut, the caretaker and guests helped Randy hobble 
the few tenths of a mile up to the height-of-land, thereby saving the rescuers 
an uphill carry. A little before 10 A.M. the rescuers arrived, and Androscoggin 
Valley Search and Rescue emergency medical technician Mike Pelchat and 
CO Jim Cyrs assessed Randy and put an Aircast over his splint. Then they 
brought him out.
Comment: This rescue went as smoothly as could be hoped, even as it 
required a lot of people power. I return to Randy’s slip and his footwear. 
Part of NHFG’s routine when they oversee a rescue includes an inventory of 
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the rescued person’s pack. The implicit question: Just how prepared was this 
person? The answer in Randy’s case was well prepared. He had the right gear 
for his hike, including crampons. But when he slipped and broke his ankle, 
Randy was wearing his snowshoes—not crampons—on a steep descent of 
hardpacked snow.
Many of us who like winter wandering have been at just this place: near 
a hut or stopping place, end of a long day, and before us a slick but not 
overtly icy slope to descend. Do we stop and change from snowshoes to better 
traction—again? Or do we think, I’ll edge down, the claws on my shoes will give 
a bit of traction; I can butt-slide if I need to. And so we go.
Snowshoes, especially those with the now-usual claws under the forefoot, 
are great for climbing. For descent of steep pitches? Not so great. Your weight 
tends to set back going downhill, and you land on the smooth, wide frame of 
a snowshoe instead of landing on the claw. If the snowshoe slips a bit, your 
weight goes back farther; it’s easy to fall backward and start sliding. Once 
sliding, the snowshoes present a lot of surface to catch on a trailside tree 
or rock.
Most of us carry three options on long winter hikes where terrain will 
vary: snowshoes, Microspikes, and crampons. Shifting from one to the other 
and back can be wearying. I take this incident as reminder to self: Make the 
change, even if you are only a quarter-mile from the hut or the car.
Point of trail sensitivity: This endnote asks for thinking about footwear in 
another way. Much of my winter walking is on snowshoes; often I choose my 
trails to accommodate this preference. If I’m lucky, some fellow snowshoer 
has preceded me, set a track. Then the walking is a form of floating, albeit 
slow. But being preceded by narrower footing—Microspikes, boots—on mild 
slopes often means dealing with dented, postholed trails; the walking is then 
uneven, sometimes difficult, surely less enjoyable, especially after a freeze-
thaw-freeze cycle. So, once we’ve cleared the slope that asked for narrow, 
spiky shoes, let’s go back to the big ones. We all thank you.
Recommended Reading: Huntington Ice
I’m not equipped to analyze technical climbing accidents, but I draw valuable 
lessons from those who are. Many of those analysts are rescuers and guides in 
our mountains, and how they look at technical trouble is often instructive. 
I find that especially true on the Mount Washington Avalanche Center site, 
where an aforementioned, expanded, educational focus on winter incidents 
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makes for must-reading. If you would go in steep snow, you should go here: 
mountwashingtonavalanchecenter.org.
Briefly, here is synopsis of the February 10, 2019, incident described on 
the MWAC site and reported widely in the media. On that day, 37-year-
old Jeremy U. left Pinkham Notch Visitor Center with the aim of climbing 
Huntington Ravine’s Central Gully. An experienced rock climber, Jeremy 
was new to high-angle snow and ice climbing. He and a partner set out 
at 7:30 A.M. and split up at the junction of Lion Head Winter Route and 
Huntington Ravine Fire Road, with a plan to meet again at Pinkham at 
4 P.M. When Jeremy didn’t appear at 4 P.M., his partner alerted AMC, who in 
turn made further calls. The directed search that followed ended at 7:45 P.M 
with the discovery of Jeremy’s body in the boulder field called the Fan. Later 
analysis indicated that Jeremy had taken a sliding fall of some 300 feet from a 
slope pitched at 35 degrees.
In an article on the MWAC site, U.S. Forest Service lead snow ranger Frank 
Carus provides a detailed description of the scene, as well as meditation on 
likely causes and risks. Carus’s thoughts spawned responses from a number of 
local mountain guides and climbers, and those responses were cast as leading 
to controversy in a long Conway Sun article on March 29 by Tom Eastman 
(“Unforgiving: Braving Mount Washington” at conwaydailysun.com). I read 
Carus’s remarks carefully and find they didn’t intend to invite controversy; 
rather, he is simply less judgmental than some of the figures quoted in the 
article. Reading both pieces and pondering their events and opinions can be 
excellent education for those of us who would go to steep slopes when the 
surfaces in those places dictate long slides if we fall.
PSAR Continued: Mapping Trouble 
In our last issue, I wrote about the National Park Service’s program known as 
PSAR, or Preventative Search and Rescue, and, in particular, about the USFS 
volunteer trailhead steward program that seeks to offer advice at popular sites 
before hikers take to the trails. Volunteer trail steward Chris Elliot outlined 
some of his experiences at the Champney Brook trailhead one October week-
end in 2018. I checked back with him recently to see how this season had 
begun. Here are few more observations from the field:
Appalachia_WS2020_FINAL 10.28.19_REV.indd   122 10/28/19   1:39 PM
WINTER/SPRING 2020   123
While at Champney my partner and I had an interesting discussion 
about paper maps. Is one unprepared if he or she hikes the mountain 
without a paper map? Having a map is one of the Ten Essentials, but it 
is noted as “a map,” not a paper map. More than 50 percent of the hikers 
we encountered had maps on their electronic devices, some were down-
loaded and some were on an app. About 20 percent had paper maps and 
the rest, upon our advice, took a picture of the trailhead map.
 My partner believed that everyone without a paper map was 
unprepared, while I was more inclined to note as unprepared those 
who arrived totally mapless. I have asked the WMNF for a response 
on this, but as of yet have not heard from them. It is certainly an 
age consideration, as most 20–40-year-olds now seem to rely on their 
electronic devices for everything, and the idea of getting a paper map 
appears unnecessary or wasteful to them. As I think you have noted we 
are in a transitional phase here, another instance where at the moment 
there is uncertainty with technology versus non-technology protocols 
and the generation of digital immigrants versus digital natives.
 I was at Champney Falls today. Of the 56 hikers who were head-
ing for the summit, 13 had paper maps, 25 had maps on their phones, 
and 18 arrived with no maps. I noted the latter 18 as unprepared in my 
report to the WMNF. Interesting data and I will continue my data 
recording at future dates. WMNF has not asked me to do this, but I 
am interested in the information. Four others were unprepared as they 
carried no water.
Comment: I’ve written in the past of my preference for paper maps, even as 
I’ve written in this report and others of those maps being carried off by winds. 
Having a map that offers the context of surrounding terrain helps orient a 
walker, partly by asking for a developed (read, practiced) skill in reading the 
map and using it effectively with a compass. A map on a screen is necessarily 
small scale, and what surrounds you is often missing or off-screen. Using a 
screen to gain a full sense of where one is seems akin to trying to see the scale 
of the ocean through a porthole. Better, I think, to go up on deck with a chart 
and scan the horizon.
— Sandy Stott
Accidents Editor
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